Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 51
Number 1 Fall 2006
2006

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.: Time for a
Legislative Response to Restore Voluntary Remediation
Nancy Kubasek
Bowling Green State University, nkubase@bgsu.edu

Jay Threet

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nancy Kubasek & Jay Threet, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.: Time for a Legislative
Response to Restore Voluntary Remediation, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol51/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

Article 7

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. v. AVIALL SERVICES, INC.: TIME FOR
A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RESTORE VOLUNTARY
REMEDIATION

NANCY KUBASEK* & JAY THREET**

INTRODUCTION
At a time when much of the current rhetoric from the Environmental
Protection Agency emphasizes voluntary compliance, and when the number of
annual completed hazardous waste site cleanups is significantly declining,1 the
United States Supreme Court handed down a surprising decision that is likely
to dramatically curtail voluntary cleanups of contaminated property2 unless
Congress steps in3 and amends the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).4 In the December 2004 case of
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,5 the United States Supreme
Court overturned settled case law that allowed the owner of contaminated
property to voluntarily remediate the property and then seek contribution from
other potentially responsible parties,6 a decision that will impose significant
* Professor of Business Law and Environmental Law, Bowling Green State University. J.D.,
University of Toledo College of Law; B.A., Education, Bowling Green State University.
** J.D. candidate, University of Toledo College of Law, 2009; M.B.A., Bowling Green State
University, 2006.
1. The number of completed CERCLA cleanups in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 has
decreased by 50 percent since the late-1990s. U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND & SIERRA CLUB, THE
TRUTH ABOUT TOXIC WASTE CLEANUPS: HOW EPA IS MISLEADING THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM 6 (2004), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/toxics/factsheets/
leanups.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
2. See, e.g., Supreme Court Limits contribution Claims Under CERCLA, AllBusiness.com,
http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-michigan-metro-areas-lansing/9115061.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
3. Some commentators do not believe that congressional intervention to save CERCLA is
likely. Citing congressional refusal to reauthorize the tax that helped fund CERCLA since its
expiration in 1995, some commentators argue that the focus should be on revitalizing state
Brownfield legislation to clean up severely contaminated sites. See, e.g., David A. Dana, State
Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 89 (2005).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000).
5. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
6. See Robert Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Environmental
Cleanups, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, March 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 3312112 (stating,
165
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costs on property owners who are trying to be good citizens by fulfilling their
legal obligations under CERCLA without waiting for a lawsuit to force them
into compliance. And what was almost as surprising as the Court’s decision
itself was the fact that despite the Bush administration’s vocal public support
for voluntary action over government enforcement, the United States Attorney
General filed an amicus curiae brief7 urging the Court to render this
Not surprisingly, twenty-three states and the
unexpected verdict.8
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico joined together and filed an amicus brief urging
the opposite outcome.9
I. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted CERCLA10 in 1980 “to facilitate the prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites and to shift the cost of environmental response from the
taxpayers to the parties who benefitted [sic] from the wastes that caused the

“Federal court decisions over the past two decades had firmly established that a party incurring
costs to investigate and remediate contaminated property could bring a contribution action to
recover some or all of these costs under the federal Superfund law . . . .”).
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192).
8. There are two key reasons why it is confusing that the Attorney General urged for this
verdict:
First, under the current administration, the Department of Justice has dropped a number of
“adversarial” lawsuits in the environmental area, preferring instead to rely on industry to
voluntarily come into compliance with environmental regulations, so it seems illogical for
the Attorney General to argue on behalf of a decision that would discourage the very kind
of voluntary compliance the Department of Justice had been advocating. Second,
historically, federal and state environmental agencies have relied on private parties to
“voluntarily” clean up thousands of sites and then utilize private contributions actions to
work out the allocation of cleanup costs with other potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
without the government having to use its scarce Superfund resources to file actions to
force these cleanups. And because Congress has failed to reauthorize the tax that had
previously provided much of the funding for enforcement actions under CERCLA, the
government is now able to bring even fewer of these actions, meaning that without
voluntary cleanups, more contaminated property will remain contaminated for longer
periods of time.
Nancy Kubasek, From the Environment, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 98, 107 n.4 (2005); see Douglas
McLeod, Superfund Lawsuits Limited: Common Pollution Cleanup Action Barred, BUS. INS.,
Dec. 20, 2004 (citing numerous environmental law attorneys who argue that the decision will, at
minimum, slow voluntary cleanups).
9. Brief of the States of New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, and The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192) [hereinafter Amici
Brief of the States].
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000).
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harm.”11 CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),12 is often celebrated as “a vital program
to safeguard human health and the environment from the toxic consequences of
decades of irresponsible waste handling.”13
The legislative format created by CERCLA provides two options for
cleaning up contaminated sites: the federal government may choose to clean up
a contaminated area itself,14 or alternatively, it may compel responsible parties
to undertake the cleanup.15 In either case, the Government may recover its
response costs under § 107, the so-called “cost recovery” section of
CERCLA.16 Section 107(a) lists four classes of potentially responsible persons
(PRPs) and provides that they “shall be liable” for, among other things, “all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.”17
Section 107(a) further provides that PRPs shall be liable for “any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person . . . not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan.”18
When CERCLA was amended in 1986,19 it provided an express cause of
action for contribution in § 113(f)(1).20 This section, the interpretation of
which is the focus of Cooper Industries, provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to
bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section
21
9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.

11. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997).
12. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
13. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & GREGORY S. WEBER, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND
TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN A NUTSHELL 256 (1997).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000).
15. Id. § 9606(a).
16. Id. § 9607(a).
17. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
18. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1986)).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
21. Id. § 9613(f)(1).
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Section 113(f)(3)(B) of CERCLA provided incentives for PRPs to enter
into judicially approved or administrative settlements with the United States or
individual states by providing that any party who resolved its liability through
such settlements would be allowed to seek contribution from other PRPs.22
Such a party also could not be held liable for claims by non-settling PRPs “for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”23
Since the passage of CERCLA, litigation has arisen over the issue of
whether a private party that has incurred response costs, but that has done so
voluntarily and is not itself subject to suit, has a cause of action for cost
recovery against other PRPs. A number of courts have held that §
107(a)(4)(B) and its predecessors authorize such a cause of action.24
Other litigation has questioned whether a private entity that has been sued
in a cost recovery action by the Government or by another PRP can obtain
contribution from other PRPs, even though CERCLA contains no provision
explicitly granting a right for contributions. Several district courts have found
that such a right arises either impliedly from the provisions of the statute,25 or
as a matter of federal common law,26 even though CERCLA, as originally
enacted, contained no provision expressly providing for a right of action for
contribution under such circumstances. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all allowed contribution suits under § 113(f)
without a prior § 106 or § 107 action.27 In light of all of these decisions, the

22. See id. § 9613(f)(2).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting that the absence of an enforcement action against Wickland under CERCLA did not
“render the controversy between Wickland and [another potentially responsible party] remote and
hypothetical.”); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that
allowing a private party to “recover response costs from responsible parties . . . is consistent with
both the language . . . and the congressional purpose underlying CERCLA as a whole.”);
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that an
“action is not barred because of some theoretical inconsistencies with statutory provisions which
have not been made operative in this case.”).
25. Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (arguing that
a contribution right is implicit in § 9607(e)(2)).
26. United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D. Del. 1986) (noting
that “[t]he CERCLA liability provision . . . leaves little room for doubt that Congress intended the
liability provision . . . to be employed as a major tool to facilitate cleanup.”); Colorado v.
ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486–92 (D. Colo. 1985).
27. See, e.g., W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 683–84 (9th Cir. 2004);
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2002);
Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2002); Crofton Ventures
Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); Kalamazoo River Study Group v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 274 F.3d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 2001); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d
416, 422 (2d Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998);
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Supreme Court’s holding in Cooper Industries was a dramatic reinterpretation
of CERCLA.28
Prior to Cooper Industries, two of the most common precursors to
contribution actions were not civil suits, but rather arose under the Unilateral
Administrative Order (UAO) and the Administrative Order on Consent
(AOC);29 the former is an administrative order to conduct a cleanup, with strict
penalties available for non-performance, and the latter is an order that arises by
an agreement among the responsible parties and the government.30 Those who
did the cleanup subject to the UAO or AOC would then sue other PRPs to
recover part of their costs.31 As the next section demonstrates, such actions
may no longer be a common tool.
II. COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. V. AVIALL SERVICES, INC.
This case originated when the buyer of an aircraft maintenance business,
Aviall Services, filed an action under CERCLA against the seller, Cooper
Industries, for contribution for environmental cleanup costs that Aviall had
voluntarily undertaken.32 Cooper Industries had owned and operated four
aircraft maintenance sites until 1981, when Aviall Services bought the sites.33
After operating the sites for a number of years, Aviall discovered that both it
and the seller, Cooper Industries, had contaminated the facilities when
petroleum and other hazardous substances leaked into the groundwater through
spills and underground storage tank leaks.34 Following the law, Aviall notified
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission of the contamination
and was notified by the Commission that it should clean up the site.35 The
company was informed that if it did not clean up the site, an enforcement
action would be brought against it.36 However, neither the Commission nor
the EPA actually took any judicial or administrative actions to force a
cleanup.37

United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); Wickland Oil
Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986).
28. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
29. Richard F. Ricci, Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall Services Inc.: Whither (Or Is It Wither)
Superfund?, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2005, at 1, 18.
30. Id.
31. Id. The author also notes that since Cooper Industries, at least one district court has
found that contribution actions could not be brought based on cleanups performed under a UAO
or AOC. Id.
32. See Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163–164.
33. See id. at 164.
34. See id. at 160–65 (offering a detailed explanation of the background facts of the case).
35. Id. at 164.
36. Id.
37. Cooper Indust., 543 U.S. at 164.
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In 1984, Aviall began to clean up the site under the supervision of the state
of Texas.38 In 1995 and 1996, Aviall sold the properties to a third party, but
remained contractually liable for the cleanup.39 In August of 1997, facing
liability of approximately $5 million in cleanup costs, Aviall filed a claim for
cost recovery under CERCLA § 107(a), a claim for contribution under
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), and various state law claims.40
Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s holding that a § 113 claim is a type of § 107
claim,41 the company subsequently amended its complaint to state a single
CERCLA claim.42 Aviall alleged that it was entitled to contribution from
Cooper, as a PRP under CERCLA § 107, for response costs and other liability
that it had incurred to clean up the Texas facilities.43
Both Aviall and Cooper filed for summary judgment, and the District
Court granted Cooper’s motion, holding that Aviall had abandoned its § 107
claim and that it was not entitled to recover under § 113 because Aviall had not
previously been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107.44
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s decision.45 The majority held that, “a PRP seeking contribution
from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1) must have a pending or adjudged § 106
administrative order or § 107(a) cost recovery action against it.”46
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, holding
that § 113(f)(1) allows a PRP to obtain contribution from other PRPs
regardless of whether the PRP has previously been sued under § 106 or §
107.47 The court held that “ [s]ection 113(f)(1) authorizes suits against PRPs
in both its first and last sentence[,] which states without qualification that
‘nothing’ in the section shall ‘diminish’ any person’s right to bring a
contribution action in the absence of a § 106 or § 107(a) action.”48 The court
reasoned in part that the word “may” in § 113(f)(1) did not mean “may only.”49

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349–53 (6th Cir. 1998);
Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1997).
42. See Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 164.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 164–65. The district court also declined to hear Aviall’s state law claims
because its federal law claims were dismissed. Id. at 164.
45. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), overruled by
Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
46. Id. at 145.
47. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 677.
48. Id. at 681.
49. Id. at 686–687.
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Three members of the en banc court dissented, arguing that the majority’s
reading of the statute was not supported by the statute’s text or its structure.50
On December 13, 2004, the United States Supreme Court overturned the
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision, holding that a potentially responsible party
cannot maintain a contribution action unless such contribution is sought either
during or after a Superfund action has been filed in federal court, or the PRP
has resolved its liability to the state or federal government in an administrative
or judicial settlement.51
The majority on the Court reached this decision by strictly interpreting the
language of the statute. In explaining why § 113(f)(1) does not authorize
Aviall’s suit, Justice Thomas wrote:
The first sentence, the enabling clause that establishes the right of contribution,
provides: “Any person may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil
action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title,” 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (emphasis added). The natural meaning of this sentence is
that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions,
52
namely, “during or following” a specified civil action.

A majority of the United States Supreme Court was not convinced by the
reasoning of Aviall and the Fifth Circuit that the word “may” was permissive,
and did not mean “only.”53 To the contrary, Justice Thomas explained that if §
113(f)(1) was intended to authorize contribution actions at any time, then
Congress would not have included the explicit “during or following”54
conditional language, and noted that the Court avoids statutory interpretations
that render part of a statute’s language superfluous.55
Justice Thomas also found that the savings clause in the last sentence of §
113(f)(1), which states that, “[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish the
right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil
action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title,”56 is not
intended to create any additional causes of action other of those “during or
following a civil action.”57 Rather, the sentence simply “rebuts any
presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling
clause is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP.”58
As further support for the majority’s interpretation of the statute, Justice
Thomas cited the lack of any statutory time limit during which an action based
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 691 (Garza, J., dissenting).
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165–66 (2004).
Id.
See id. at 166–168.
Id. at 165–166.
Id. at 166; see also United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 166–67.
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on a voluntary cleanup can be brought.59 He pointed out that there are two
specific situations in which contribution can be sought: “‘during or following’
specified civil actions” under § 113(f)(1), and “after an administrative or
judicially approved settlement that resolves liability to the United States or a
State.”60 For the former actions, there is a three-year time limit to commence
suit, which begins to run on the date of the judgment,61 and for the latter there
is a three-year limitations period that begins to run on the date of settlement.62
Nowhere in the statute is there a limitations period for the commencement of
contribution actions based on voluntary cleanups, and therefore, Justice
Thomas concluded that such actions must not have been contemplated by
Congress.63
The decision in this case, however, was not as destructive to PRP rights as
it could have been. The Court did leave a couple issues unresolved that might
ultimately provide a route for some PRPs to recover. The Court noted in a
footnote, for example, that it was not addressing the issue of whether a party
that has received a unilateral administrative order by the EPA under § 106,
unaccompanied by an enforcement lawsuit under § 106, would be able to
pursue contribution under § 113(f)(1).64
Aviall could not persuade the Court to consider an alternative implied right
of recovery from Cooper under § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.65 The Court
chose to leave this issue unresolved 66 because Aviall had neglected to raise the
issue in the lower courts.67 Even if Aviall had raised the issue in the lower

59. Id. at 167. In their brief, the States had urged the Court not to rely too heavily on the
lack of a specific limitations period for the commencement of suits by those doing voluntary
cleanups because “when CERCLA was enacted in 1980 and amended in 1986, it was far from
unusual for Congress to create a cause of action but fail to provide a pertinent period of
limitations, thereby leaving it to the courts to ‘borrow’ an appropriate applicable period from
other sources of law.” Amici Brief of the States, supra note 9, at 7.
60. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (G)(3)(A) (2000).
62. Id. § 9613(g)(3)(B).
63. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167.
64. Id. at 168, n.5. For further discussion of this unresolved issue, see Christopher P. Davis,
United States: Navigating the CERCLA Contribution Landscape in the Aftermath of Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Jan. 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 1804060.
65. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 170–71 (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 638–47 (1981) and Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S.
77, 90–99 (1981)). The Court has previously refused to read an implied right of contribution into
federal statutes. See Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91–95.
66. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 168–69.
67. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 109 (2001) for the
proposition that “[w]e ordinarily do not decide, in the first instance issues not decided below”).
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courts, it is safe to assume that the lower courts would have relied on the
Court’s previous precedent, and not found an implied right of recovery.68
As the lawyer representing Cooper Industries pointed out, many states
have laws that allow parties who voluntarily clean up a site to seek
contributions from others who contributed to the contamination.69 However,
although contribution actions can still be brought under state law, the Court’s
interpretation of the “savings clause” in § 113(f)(1) leaves a void in the federal
hazardous waste cleanup efforts.
III. STATE SOLUTIONS TO THE CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
A private party can attempt to obtain contribution through state law, but
there is a risk that state law contribution schemes may be pre-empted by
CERCLA.70 Currently, twenty-seven states have addressed the problem of
hazardous waste through legislation on voluntary remediation. These states go
beyond defining a “responsible party” or mirroring CERCLA in their
respective environmental management laws. Though they attack the problem
of voluntary remediation differently, it can be said that they are headed in the
right direction. One can only hope the federal government will follow in
rewarding voluntary remediation instead of discouraging it.
Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana have recognized that encouraging the
voluntary remediation and redevelopment of property is in their states’
respective interest. Alabama has established a revolving fund program to
“encourage and assist the assessment, remediation, and redevelopment of
previously used property which is contaminated or perceived to be
contaminated.”71 Florida allows those who voluntarily remediate their site to
apply for compensation through their Inland Protection Trust Fund.72 The
route chosen by these states, although encouraging from an environmental
perspective, leaves the taxpayers financially responsible for the remediation.
Louisiana has chosen to give tax credit for voluntary remediation of
hazardous waste.73 This legislation may be in response to the “[h]azardous

68. Several appellate courts have held that a PRP is limited solely to a claim for contribution
under CERCLA § 113. See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2nd Cir. 1998);
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir.
1998) (stating that PRPs must seek contribution under CERCLA § 113).
69. See infra, Part III (discussing state law solutions to cleanup of hazardous waste).
70. See In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1997); Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d
at 425–27.
71. ALA. CODE § 22-30F-2 (2005).
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.3071 (2006).
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6021. Louisiana’s Brownfield cleanup tax credit is equal to
25 percent of the investment in a voluntary remediation of a state-certified contaminated site, or
15 percent of the investment in a voluntary remedial investigation. Id. Credit can be carried
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chemicals and substances [that] have been disposed of in Louisiana for many
years in a manner that, although possibly legal at the time, was careless and
inappropriate and created conditions which are extremely dangerous and may
cause long-term health and environmental problems for the people of this
state.”74
Nineteen states that have addressed voluntary remediation have extensive
laws discussing everything from redevelopment of the land to future liability of
those undertaking voluntary remediation.75 These laws establish programs of

forward for up to ten years. Id. This statute became effective July 1, 2005, for tax periods
beginning after Dec. 31, 2004. Id.
74. Id. at § 30:2271(A)(1) (2005). The additional purposes of the statute are as follows:
(2) Hazardous substances are produced and transported on a regular basis around this state
and there have been numerous recent discharges resulting from accidents which have
caused extensive damage to the citizens of the state and have caused the state to expend
large sums to respond to these incidents.
(3) Those persons generating these substances knew or were in a position to know of the
hazardous and dangerous nature of the substances which they were producing and knew
or should have known that improper disposal could have long-term health risks and could
cause irreversible environmental damage.
(4) The state cannot and should not bear the costs associated with a private profit making
venture.
Id. § 30:2271(A)(2)–(4).
75. See Voluntary Remediation Program, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-171–49-188 (2005);
Voluntary Clean-up and Redevelopment Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-301–25-26-311
(2005); Idaho Land Remediation Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-7201–39-7210 (2002 & Supp.
2006); Voluntary Remediation of Hazardous Substances and Petroleum Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§
13-25-5-1–13-25-5-23(2000 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment
Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-34,161–65-34,174 (2003 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Environmental
Remediation Program, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-510–224.01-532 (2002 & Supp. 2005);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2285–30:2290 (2000 & Supp. 2006); Mississippi Brownfields
Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-35-1–49-35-27 (2003 &
Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 260.565–260.575 (2000 & Supp. 2005); Voluntary Remediation
Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4G-1–74-4G-12 (2000 Supp. 2005); Comprehensive Environmental
Cleanup and Responsibility Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-701–75-10-752 (2005); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (establishing a comparative negligence system in assigning fault in
hazardous waste cases); Oklahoma Brownfields Voluntary Redevelopment Act, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27A, §§ 2-, §§ 15-101–15-110 (1997 & Supp. 2006) (stating that Oklahoma’s
Department of Environmental Quality will issue a certificate of completion for successful
voluntary remediation programs); Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
6020.101–6020.1305 (2003 & Supp. 2006) (defining the responsible person, scope of liability,
and defenses to liability in the cleanup of hazardous sites); Brownfield Projects Voluntary
Cleanup Oversight and Assistance Program, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224 (2001 & Supp.
2005); Voluntary Remediation Program, VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1232 (2006); Voluntary Waste
Reduction Plan, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.95C.200 (2002 & Supp. 2006); Voluntary
Remediation and Redevelopment Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 22-22-1–22-22-21 (2002 & Supp. 2006);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 292.15 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-1601–35-11-1613 (2005).
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governmental evaluation and step-by-step completion of voluntary
remediation.
Three states, California, Oregon, and Rhode Island, have strong statutes
that take the extra step of determining the liability of not only one who
voluntarily cleans up a site, but also previous owners who are potentially
responsible. California’s Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance
Account Act76 “explicitly authorizes any [potentially responsible party] that
has incurred response costs to seek contribution from any other [potentially
responsible party].”77 It should also be noted that this Act excludes
“[p]etroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof . . . .”78
In Oregon, a person who is liable or may be liable may seek contribution
from others who are liable or may be liable.79 This statute is applicable in
contracts of leases.80 The contribution costs among liable parties are
determined by the court.81
Rhode Island’s Industrial Property Remediation and Reuse Act (IPRRA)82
is unique in the fact that it was intended to explain portions of the Hazardous
Waste Management Act83 that may have been unclear.84 The IPRRA explicitly
refers to previous owners as responsible parties.85 Now the courts have further
interpreted liability under both statutes to be attached to incidents that occurred
prior to enactment.86
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300–25395.40 (2006).
77. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2002). The
court went on to note:
[U]nlike liability under CERCLA, liability under HSAA is not truly joint and severable.
Any person found liable for costs under HSAA who establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that only a portion of those costs or expenditures are attributable to that person’s
actions will be required to pay only for that portion. Liability under HSAA is therefore
apportioned according to fault.
Id. at 946.
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317(a) (2006); see Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
818 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that because gasoline is a crude oil fraction, but is
not a specifically listed hazardous substance, gasoline is exempt from the Act).
79. OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257 (2005).
80. See Newell v. Weston, 946 P.2d 691, 701 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). In this case, the trial
court allocated all of the remediation costs to the defendant because the evidence showed that the
release of gasoline took place entirely during the defendant’s lease term from a tank that the
defendant had installed, and that the defendant had refused to participate in the remediation. Id.
81. OR. REV. STAT. § 465.257(1) (2005).
82. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.14-1–23-19.14-19 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
83. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.1-1–23-19.1-36 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
84. See Charter Int’l Oil Co. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 104 (D. R.I. 1996) (arguing that
the Hazardous Waste Management Act includes previous owners as responsible parties).
85. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-6(a)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2005).
86. See, e.g., Charter Int’l Oil Co., 925 F. Supp. at 109; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.141 (indicating that the legislative intent was to extend liability under the act to instances in which
the contamination occurred prior to enactment of this act).
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New Jersey will also be impacted by the ruling in Cooper Industries since
its Spill Compensation and Control Act87 is similar to CERCLA. Buying
property in states that lack strong environmental laws such as the Spill Act is
likely to make potential purchasers somewhat reluctant to invest in property
without receiving adequate representation and indemnification.88 “Without
such contractual obligations, the former owners may now avoid contributing to
any cleanup.”89 Now, pre-acquisition environmental audits are even more
important.90 Therefore, “it is critical that any environmental consultant
performing such an audit be held accountable for failure to identify
environmental contamination so that the purchaser [will not] be left
shouldering all environmental cleanup costs.”91
States have a strong interest in encouraging cleanups and avoiding
litigation. The fact that twenty-three state attorneys general filed an amicus
brief in support of Aviall Services’ position and urged the Court to affirm the
Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision indicates that some states are sympathetic to a
PRP’s right to contribution.92 Because of this, private parties should consult
with the relevant state agencies for recent pronouncements on how to handle
such a settlement.
Such parties should also consider whether § 128 of the Small Business
Liability and Brownfields Revitalization Act93 might result in their having
resolved their liability in states that have entered into memoranda of agreement
(MOAs) with the EPA. Under such agreements, a party’s participation in the
state’s voluntary cleanup program precludes the EPA from taking CERCLA
enforcement action.94

87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (1992 & Supp. 2006).
88. Gerald M. Giordano, Ruling Makes it Harder to Recoup Cleanup Cost; CERCLA
Contribution at Issue, 14 N.J. LAW., Mar. 21, 2005, at 7, 10.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Amici Brief of the States, supra note 9.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2000).
94. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have not entered into a Voluntary Cleanup
Program MOA with the EPA, while the state of Pennsylvania has entered into an MOA. See
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Office of Brownfields Cleanup and
Redevelopment, EPA, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN
UPDATE
FROM
THE
STATES,
(Feb.
2005),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pubs/st_res_prog_report.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005); see
also One Cleanup Program: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and Region 3 of the United States
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(Apr.
21,
2004),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/newsletters/2004-04-21.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
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IV. THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court chose not to follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
that a § 113(f) contribution action was essentially a type of cost recovery
action under § 107.95 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning had been mirrored by the
Tenth Circuit in the case of Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,96 as well as
by five other circuits.97 The Court decided in Sun Co., Inc. that one starting
voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste should have a six-year limitations period
to seek contribution from a PRP.98 The Court was not persuaded by the
plaintiff’s argument that cleanup costs were not incurred pursuant to a civil
action under §§ 106 or 107.99 The Court ruled that “if a contribution action is
not the initial action, then by definition a previous action will have been filed,
and one of the four triggering events in § 113(g)(3) will occur.”100 There are,
in effect, two different types of contribution actions under CERCLA, each
governed by the same rules of § 113(f) and each seeking to equitably allocate
costs referred to in § 107, but governed by different statutes of limitation.101
If the Supreme Court had adopted this reasoning in Cooper Industries, the
Court would have reached a result that was consistent with one of the primary
goals of CERCLA: the prompt cleanup of dangerous substances.102 Instead,
we now have a statute that discourages PRPs from removing harmful materials
from the environment until they are sued.
The dissenting opinion by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens in Cooper
Industries criticizes the Court’s refusal to see that § 107(a) “enable[s] a PRP to
sue other covered persons for reimbursement, in whole or part, of cleanup
costs the PRP legitimately incurred.”103 Their dissent is well founded. Nearly
ten years before Cooper Industries, in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, the
Court found that § 107(a) enables one to sue for reimbursement.104 What the
Key Tronic Court could not agree upon was whether the right of action was
95. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
96. 124 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1997).
97. See W. Properties Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 2004);
Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 294–95 (4th Cir. 2001); Kalamazoo
River Study Group v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 274 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir. 2001); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 151
F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 1998).
98. Sun Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1192–93.
99. Id. at 1192.
100. Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original).
101. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 806, 816 (1994) (recognizing two
“similar and somewhat overlapping” contribution actions under §§ 107 and 113).
102. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir.
1997).
103. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
104. 511 U.S. 806, 816 (1994).
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express or implied.105 Following this fact pattern, Aviall would have a right to
contribution. The dissenters in Cooper Industries, in order to avoid protracting
the litigation, thought that the Supreme Court should have decided that a
potentially responsible party like Aviall could recover a proportionate share of
its costs pursuant to § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA,106 which provides for the
recovery from the “covered persons” in § 107(a) of “any . . . necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan.”107 The majority specifically declined to address that issue and others.108
Further investigation of the intent behind CERCLA shifts the blame for this
confusion from the majority of the Court to the legislators on Capitol Hill.
The issue of recovery under a § 107 claim was raised last year in the
Southern District of New York.109 In Elementis, the current owner of several
contaminated sites sought to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery action against the
former property owner.110 The plaintiff maintained that current Second Circuit
precedent, set forth in Bedford Affiliates v. Sills,111 precluding a PRP from
proceeding under § 107(a), is no longer binding in light of the Cooper
Industries decision.112 The Southern District rejected this argument, holding
that the Supreme Court in Cooper Industries expressly “withheld judgment
regarding the correctness of Bedford Affiliates and other decisions of the
Courts of Appeals.”113 The Southern District further held that, “in the Second
Circuit, the Supreme Court will not be held to have implicitly expressed an
opinion on a question which it explicitly declines to address . . . even if the
Supreme Court’s future expression of that opinion is viewed by some as quite
likely . . . .”114 “Thus, it appears that the question of how §§ 107 and 113 of
CERCLA meant to co-exist is still a complicated one that may be taken up by
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court” soon.115

105. Id.
106. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 174.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
108. For example, the majority did not address whether a § 106 administrative order is a
“civil action” within the meaning of § 113(f)(1) or what the “savings clause” of § 113(f)(1) saved.
The majority’s refusal to do so leaves it to the lower courts to resolve such issues.
109. Elementis Chems. Inc. v. T H Agric. and Nutrition, L.L.C., 373 F. Supp. 2d 257, 263–
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
110. Id. at 263.
111. 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998).
112. See Elementis, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
113. The Court declined to decide whether a PRP had an implied right of contribution under
CERCLA § 107. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004).
114. Elementis, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
115. Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court’s Limitation On Private Cost
Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished—Part II, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL: NE. ED., May 2005, at 8.
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Impact of Cooper Industries: Before and After

Before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cooper Industries, the courts of
appeals had held that PRPs may sue each other for apportionment of costs
under § 113 alone,116 or together with § 117.117 The courts of appeals agreed
that a PRP must sue for contribution under § 113 because such a claim can be
considered an “initial action of recovery.”118 With the federal appellate courts
in agreement, it was taken for granted that PRPs had legitimate cost-recovery
claims under CERCLA.
Like Aviall, post-Cooper Industries PRPs have run into trouble recovering
contribution in many cases. The same federal courts that once held in favor of
recovery under § 113 are now obligated to follow the Court’s stance from
Cooper Industries. The current legal scene makes the recovery process almost
comical. A PRP must be sued by the EPA under § 106 or be sued under §
107(a) in order to bring a contribution suit under § 113(f)(1). There is some
mystery as to whether being in the process of settlement with a state agency
would constitute an “administrative settlement” under § 113.119
In the first case, the PRP would need to be in the process of an order to be
sued by the EPA under § 106. The problems with this route abound. The PRP
would initially have to receive an administrative order from the EPA, fail to
comply with it, and then wait for the EPA to sue.120 Or else, the EPA could
proceed to conduct the response action on its own, and then seek to recover
potentially three times the cost of cleanup from the party.121 In this case, the
noncompliant PRP could be liable for daily penalties of $32,500 per day over
the course of a cleanup that could last for years.122
In the case of settlement with a state agency, it is undetermined whether
conducting a cleanup under state supervision is considered an administrative

116. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v.
Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co.,
50 F.3d 1530, 1534–36 (10th Cir. 1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764
(7th Cir. 1994).
117. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997).
“The contours and mechanics of this right are now governed by § 113. Put another way, while §
107 created the right of contribution, the “machinery” of § 113 governs and regulates such
actions, providing the details and explicit recognition that were missing from the text of § 107.”
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (3d Cir. 1997).
118. Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924–925 (5th Cir. 2001); Sun Co.,
Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000).
120. Id. § 9606(b)(1).
121. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
122. See Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 7121, 7126 (Feb.
13, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 19).
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settlement. This “administrative settlement” is a requirement to bring an action
for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B).123
The United States can effectively limit its contribution exposure by
electing to use enforcement authorities other than civil actions under §§ 106
and 107.124 This is something private parties do not have the luxury of doing.
The RCRA citizen suit provision provides that a person may bring suit against
any person “who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment.”125 At least four requirements must be met to
qualify for contribution rights:
(1) there must be at least a partial resolution of liability to the United States or
a state, (2) for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of
such an action, (3) the resolved liability must be for “response” actions or
costs, and (4) the resolution of liability must be documented in an
126
administrative or judicially approved settlement.

The problem with fulfilling these requirements is often a procedural one. The
EPA and its counterpart state regulatory agencies “lack the resources to grind
out large numbers of these documents.”127 Even when completed, the
provision has its limits. It provides for broad substantive and procedural relief
including injunctive relief and recovery of attorney fees, but cannot be used to
recover past costs.128
B.

The EPA’s Role in CERCLA

The EPA showed a lack of confidence in cleanup activities performed on a
purely voluntary basis by private PRPs. It preferred the role of dealing out
“negotiated settlements” with the agency to reduce future litigation.129 The
EPA wanted to sanction even voluntary cleanups to ensure the remedial steps
taken were adequate.130 If not, the PRPs who acted voluntarily could still be
subject to enforcement action.131
This is the background for the SARA amendments in 1986. Thus, the right
of contribution was, as the Supreme Court affirmed in Cooper Industries, made
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000).
124. Examples include § 106 orders and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
enforcement actions.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000).
126. William H. Hyatt, Jr. & Emily L. Won, CERCLA Contribution Rights After Cooper
Industries, METRO. CORP. COUNS., at 14 (Ne. ed. Apr. 2005).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 6972(a), (e).
129. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5037–38 (Feb. 5, 1985).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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available under § 113(f)(1) solely to PRPs initiating response actions “during
or following” enforcement suits under §§ 106 and 107(a).132 Moreover, the
only other “federal contribution” door opened by SARA allowed one PRP to
pursue another for an apportionment of cleanup costs under § 113(f)(3)(B), but
only after the party seeking contribution had first held an administratively or
judicially approved settlement with the state or federal environmental
authorities.133
“The law gives the EPA authority to go after industrial polluters, and it
also taxes the chemical and petroleum industries to set up a cleanup fund. If
no person or party is found liable for a hazardous waste site, Superfund money
is allocated for clean-up.”134
Russell Selman, an environmental partner at Katten, Muchin, Zavis,
Rosenman, believes that consent decrees from the EPA are the only answer for
his corporate clients if someone else is responsible.135 According to Selman,
“[p]arties can no longer afford not to do their homework on the assumption
they can recover their costs down the line.”136 If a party settles with the EPA
under a consent decree, the party will be able to receive contribution, though
the EPA more often issues orders through § 106.137
C. The Department of Defense: A Roadblock to Reversing the Supreme Court
Within the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) has left a
“toxic legacy . . . as a result of [two] centuries of testing, training, [and]
weapons manufacturing, [ranging] from unexploded bombs to nuclear
waste.”138 The DOD is the world’s largest polluter, producing more hazardous
waste per year than the five largest United States chemical companies
combined.139 Of the 428 Superfund sites in 2004,140 at least 135 were
federally-owned or operated sites marked for cleanup and remediation as
National Priorities list cites.141 The federal government faced over $249

132. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000); see also Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 167.
134. Tom McCann, Aviall Throws Wrench in Environmental Cleanup Machine, CHI. LAW.,
May, 2005, at 58.
135. Id. “We have clients with anywhere from 10 to 120 polluted sites around the country.
We’ve submitted them to several federal and state voluntary cleanup programs, and we’re now
ripping them out and determining if there is anyone we can sue.” Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 149 Cong. Rec. H1909 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2003) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer).
139. Bob Feldman, War on the Earth, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 24.
140. FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPERFUND ANN. REP., at A-1 (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/uperfund/action/process/fy2004.htm. This number includes all EPA lead
sites, Potentially Responsible Party lead sites, and Federal Facility sites. Id.
141. Id. at 11.
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billion in environmental liabilities at the end of fiscal year 2004.142 More than
$64 billion dollars in those environmental liabilities comes from the DOD
alone.143
As Hyatt and Woo point out in an article directed toward corporate
counsel, since the United States, unlike private parties, will be immune from
state contribution liability, except at federal facilities, the ruling in Cooper
Industries would appear to provide the federal government with an entirely
new defense strategy to avoid CERCLA liability.144 This strategy would be to
limit its exposure in contribution to the instances in which the United States
has instituted a § 106 abatement action,145 or when a state or tribe has sued for
§ 107 cost recoveries.146 These two situations represent a small percentage of
cleanup activity; the ruling in Cooper Industries has allowed the government to
cover itself effectively with this strategy.147
The United States has both an interest in limiting CERCLA’s scope to
protect itself from liability and a duty to keep its citizens safe from the
destructive ramifications of hazardous waste. It is truly a delicate balance.
The Supreme Court’s ruling limiting the timing of § 113 contribution actions
results in the federal government’s having to defend fewer CERCLA
contribution suits.148 Despite the desire to protect the DOD, Congress and the
Department of Justice149 must put the health and safety of its citizens first.

142. 2004 FIN. REP. OF THE U.S. GOV., 125, available at http://www.gao.gov/inancial/
4frusg.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Hyatt & Won, supra note 126.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2000).
146. Hyatt & Won, supra note 126. CERCLA also provides liability for “all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2000).
147. Id.
148. See Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 101 (2005) (noting that plaintiff-appellants are not
eligible to seek contribution under CERCLA § 113(f) unless they have been sued under §§ 106 or
107(a)); see Steve Seidenberg, Conflicting Rulings Leave Superfund Clean-Ups In Limbo, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, at 50 (stating that “[t]he decision has huge ramifications for owners of
superfund sites, companies that allegedly polluted such sites, and communities that want to clean
up Superfund sites quickly.”).
149. See Ricci, supra note 29, at 18. This theory attributes the DOJ’s position to a desire to
insulate the Department of Defense from contribution liability. Perhaps the most conspiratorial
theory is that the DOJ’s position was driven by a desire to gut the Superfund program. The logic
of this theory is that the construction of the statute that the DOJ advocated and the Supreme Court
adopted will act as a strong disincentive to voluntary investigations and cleanups. At the same
time, federal budget deficits coupled with Congress’ refusal to reinstate the tax that had initially
funded the Superfund program, will severely hamper the government’s ability to conduct
cleanups on its own or bring the civil actions which are now a predicate to contribution actions
under § 113. This combination of events, over time, could bring the Superfund program to a
grinding halt.
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Limiting the government’s liability and failing to protect the health and
safety of its citizens seem to stem further back than the judiciary. Congress
enacted CERCLA with enough room for interpretation to result in the ruling of
Cooper Industries. Amending CERCLA to specifically allow contribution
suits under § 113 without a PRP being sued by the EPA under §§ 106 or 107 is
the rational way to correct this inadvertent error.
CONCLUSION
A number of commentators have speculated that the decision in Cooper
Industries is going to slow the cleanup of contaminated sites.150 Prior to
Cooper Industries, a property owner who discovers that his property might be
contaminated would often voluntarily investigate and remediate his site to
avoid being the target of a government action, knowing that he would be able
to recover at least part of the costs of cleanup from other potentially
responsible parties. However, after Cooper Industries, the property owner has
no incentive to move expeditiously. If he acts voluntarily, he now has to bear
the cost of cleanup alone. Because Congress has not reauthorized the
Superfund tax, there is even less money available for remediation under
CERCLA, and thus the number of actions filed by the federal government is
likely to increase, and consequently, more sites will go unremediated for
longer amounts of time. Also, given the current administration’s less than
aggressive attitude toward enforcement, firms are not likely to be motivated by
fear of enforcement to clean up unremediate sites voluntarily.151
The parties most adversely affected by the decision, of course, are those
PRPs who relied on existing case law, and voluntarily began cleanup action

150. See, e.g., Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court’s Limitation on
Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished—Part I,
METRO. CORP. COUNS., Apr. 5, 2005, at 16. Leland and Finger argue:
The Supreme Court’s decision is likely to discourage PRPs from voluntarily cleaning up
contaminated sites because they will not be able to recoup their response costs from other
PRPs under CERCLA. Rather, PRPs will be relegated to asserting state statutory claims
or common law claims to recover response costs, which method of recovery is typically
not preferable, as such claims will not allow PRPs the same degree of access to the
Federal courts. To preserve their right to seek contribution under CERCLA and avail
themselves of the Federal courts, PRPs aware of contamination on their property may be
apt to wait for government to compel a cleanup or remediate the site and sue for the
recovery of its response costs. Given the government’s limited resources and the lessthan-aggressive posture of the Bush Administration (which submitted a brief supporting
the prevailing party’s decision) in environmental enforcement, many contaminated sites
that otherwise may have undergone a voluntary cleanup may remain unremediated for
longer periods of time.
Id.; see also Robert C. Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Environmental
Cleanups, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Mar. 4, 2005).
151. Leland & Finger, supra note 150, at 16.
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and then filed cost recovery claims under CERCLA. Their options have
dwindled. Lower courts, relying on Cooper Industries, have already begun
dismissing such claims,152 and the remaining state solutions available to them
are few and far between.
Because the decision of this case is so inconsistent with the intent of
Congress in passing CERCLA initially, and because the holding negates many
of the benefits of the Brownfield Revitalization and Environmental Restoration
Act, some environmental attorneys believe it is likely that Congress will act to
limit the impact of the decision in Cooper Industries.153
There are three possible approaches the legislative fix could take: eliminate
the words “during or following” from the enabling clause,154 add the word
“before” in front of that phrase in the statutory language, or amend CERCLA
to explicitly authorize any potentially responsible party that has incurred
response costs to seek contribution from any other potentially responsible
party. It is time that Congress put the best interests of United States citizens
and the environment ahead of the interests of the PRPs responsible for the
creation and unsafe disposal of hazardous waste.

152. See, e.g., Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Schilberg, No. 3:01CV896 (MRK),
2005 WL 1683494, at *7 (D. Conn. Jul. 19, 2005); City of Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 362 F.
Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, LLC, 382 F.
Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Ill. 2005).
153. Norman Carlin & Andrea L. Courtney, Cooper v. Aviall Decision, MONDAQ BUS.
BRIEFING (Jan. 26, 2005).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(F)(1) (2000).

